



To lawyers, corruption is mainly a problem of law enforcement.
Bribes and other types of corrupt dealings are hard to observe and
to prosecute if both sides gain from the transaction, because even
clear losers may risk retaliation if they report a transaction. The
economic analysis of bribery frequently views it only as a special
case of the economic analysis of criminal behavior more generally.1
This focus on law enforcement begs some interesting questions.
The very concept of corruption is contested in some quarters,
requiring an analysis of deep questions defining the relationship
between state and society. I address these issues in Parts I and II
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by confronting the seemingly disparate views of free market
libertarians and of ethnographers who study corruption as an
aspect of the relations between state and society. Although their
views are fundamentally different in many respects, they are both
skeptical of the modern state and frequently see “corruption” as a
superior alternative to abiding by the formal law. Next, in Part III, I
explore how free-marketeers and cultural ethnographers confront
what is called “grand corruption”—involving political leaders and
multi-national firms. Here, we see a marked reversal. Corporate
interests, which in other circumstances emphasize the value of the
free market, here characteristically invoke local cultural practices as
an excuse for making payoffs. In contrast, it is the scholars of local
cultural practices who invoke the predominance of economic
incentives—that is, the greed and the profit motive of multi-national
firms—to condemn grand corruption. After confronting these
curious convergences and conceptual reversals, Part IV develops
my own “democratic legitimacy” approach. It stresses the way
pervasive corruption undermines the competence, fairness, and
democratic legitimacy of the modern state. It substitutes the
criterion of willingness-to-pay for criteria based on desert, need,
efficiency, and other values. This approach leads to a suggested
reform agenda consistent with the goal of strengthening state
Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State about:reader?url=https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/corruption-greed-culture-and-the-state
2 of 29 4/4/2019 2:50 PM
capacity and accountability.
I. libertarians and corruption
Libertarians view corruption as a symptom of an intrusive, meddling
state that systematically reins in the free market and undermines
entrepreneurial activity and competition. Their solution is to reduce
the state to its bare bones so that it does little more than protect
private property and provide security. They argue that market actors
who pay bribes to avoid complying with the rules, to lower tax bills,
or to get favors, limit the harm that the state can do and
consequently enhance the benevolent operation of the free market
as a locus of individual freedom.2 Although in the libertarian view
the best solution would be a drastic cutback in the state, bribery
can seem a second-best technique that permits free markets to
function in a rough and ready fashion.
Libertarians start with the presumption that the unfettered market is
best. They are less concerned with the legality or illegality of quid
pro quo deals. The primaryissue is whether the transaction furthers
economic freedom. A bribe to get around a costly regulation would
be approved, but one to induce the police to harass your
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competitors would not. A natural implication of this approach is that
a small government with few responsibilities is best. Gary Becker of
the University of Chicago has been a strong advocate of this view
with essays titled To Root Out Corruption, Boot Out Big
Government and If You Want to Cut Corruption, Cut Government.3
Work based on the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic
Freedom echoes Becker’s libertarian view.One essay notes the
correlation between the Index of Economic Freedom and low levels
of corruption. The authors “believe economic freedom is intrinsically
connected to the level of government activity in an economy. The
fewer resources (including assets and regulatory power) a
government controls, the fewer the opportunities for corruption.”4
This perspective suggests that the state is a kleptocratic monster
that makes no pretense of operating in the interests of its citizens.5
Laws against bribe-taking by underlings only permit higher-up
officials to extract more for themselves. These laws do nothing to
further any notion of “good government.” Geoffrey Brennan and
James Buchanan, for example, borrow Thomas Hobbes’s
description of the state as a Leviathan and model it as a hungry
beast seeking to maximize its control over revenue. For them,
taxation and regulation are equivalent to theft, and although they
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recognize the need for a minimal state, they argue for constitutional
limits on taxing, spending, and regulating.6 They assume that
political power, not outright corruption, is the problem, but if
government officials are self-interested revenue maximizers, it
seems consistent with their model for those with political power to
extract private benefits for themselves, risking a descent into
outright kleptocracy. This extreme view is far from reality. Modern
representative democracies are certainly imperfect, but they do
manage to translate public preferences into practical policies. Most
officials cannot or do not seek to exploit all opportunities for private
gain. One can study corruption without succumbing to extreme
cynicism about the kleptocratic or Leviathan state. Modern
governments impose constitutional and institutional constraints that
limit self-seeking, and the state can seek to attract individuals to
public service careers who have the values needed to resist
temptations to enrich themselves at state expense.
The libertarian approach seldom takes public institutions seriously
as reflections of democratic and constitutional choices. One should
not expect majoritarian democracies to produce fully efficient
outcomes. They will reflect majority sentiment and the
organizational ability of different groups. They are bound to produce
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some inefficient regulations and impose costs on some to benefit
others. Nevertheless, in a well-functioning democracy, they
represent legitimate, if imperfect, efforts to respect the will of the
citizenry. So long as fundamental constitutional and human rights
are respected, bad laws do not justify corrupt efforts to undermine
their administration. One cannot defend oneself against a bribery
charge by introducing into evidence a social science study that
demonstrates a law’s inefficiency. The libertarian defense of bribery
as a way to avoid the demands of public officials trivializes and
undermines democratic institutions.
II. ethnography and corruption
Cultural anthropologists also tend to be sympathetic to gifts and
favors that others call corruption, but they reach that conclusion by
a very different route. They study payments or gifts given to officials
and the mutual exchange of favors, including electoral quid pro
quos. They look to traditions that emphasize loyalties to friends,
family, region, tribe, religion, or ethnic group. These practices
privilege informal, friendly social contacts over arms-length,
rule-bound transactions. Scholars in this tradition often refuse to
label transactions as corrupt if they are based on affective ties, or
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they claim that, even if formally illegal, the practices are socially
acceptable, economically beneficial, and compensate for the
imperfections of government and of electoral institutions.
All modern states are dominated by a formal set of rules and laws
administered by public officials and influenced by the choices of
political leaders, whether elected or appointed. States may
incorporate values and practices that clash with a society’s
traditions. If nepotism and payments in money or in kind are
formally illegal, there may be a mismatch between traditional
practices, on the one hand, and efforts to develop impersonal
bureaucratic processes and democratic electoral systems, on the
other. This disjunction is particularly acute if a society is making a
transition from personalistic modes of interaction between rulers
and the ruled to relationships based on arms-length, impersonal,
professional interactions. Impartiality clashes with feelings of duty
and loyalty to kin and in-group.
Many ethnographers have studied societies where corruption is
intertwined in citizens’ day-to-day experience with the public sector.
Payoffs are not arm’s-length transactions but are part of a social
interaction. They mix economic motives and social practices.7
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However, even if social norms help to justify the behavior, economic
motives—for example. getting a government contract, or issuance
of a business license—often motivate the transaction. Citizens may
be paid to vote and pay to get access to education and health care.
If they wish, for example, to register a property deed, obtain a
telephone line, or obtain their pension checks, payoffs are routine in
some societies. Avoiding costs, such as taxes and tariffs often
requires a bribe. Actual or invented violations of the law lead to
bribery demands from police or inspectors. In judicial proceedings,
bribes assure a friendly judge, lower fines, and can lead to the
“loss” of key documents. Thus, whatever the cultural explanations,
the consequences for government functioning can be extremely
detrimental.
Olivier de Sardan develops these themes in the African context.8
Social norms support interactions that outsiders see as corrupt but
that the participants view as acceptable or even moral. The
politically powerful are expected to receive tribute from their
subjects. If politicians or public officials have the opportunity to
enrich themselves, they have an obligation to do so and to share
generously with those who helped them to advance. This puts civil
servants in a bind. Their professional legitimacy arises from their
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training as public administrators on the European model, but their
social legitimacy depends on conforming to local norms that clash
with their training. Research on Ghana and Nigeria confirms this
basic pattern.
In Ghana, Jennifer Hasty describes corruption as “an intensification
of contact with the vital flows coursing through the political body,”9
and she notes the prevalence of metaphors of eating and of the
flow of blood to describe the practice. Corruption is not seen as the
impersonal market invading the state but rather as hyper-
engagement in already existing sociopolitical flows. In Nigeria,
Daniel Jordon Smith finds corruption embedded in “everyday
instances of patronage” that are related to networks of kin,
community, and other interpersonal associations. Corruption that
helps ones friends and kin “can look like moral behavior from local
perspectives.”10 As Smith concludes, a feedback loop perpetuates
corruption. State offices are unreliable in delivering basic services.
Yet, the use of clientelistic networks to deliver public resources
based on “moral obligations and affective attachments” fuels a
cycle of corruption.11
Nevertheless, anthropological accounts report that most people
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recognize corruption as a deep problem even as they affirm the
social bonds that it expresses. In Africa corruption is “as frequently
denounced in words as it is practiced in fact.”12 There is a
continuum “from bribing someone and thanking someone for
services rendered.”13 Even though the briber often claims to have
“good reason” for his actions, he also condemns the behavior of
others who obtain benefits through payoffs and connections.
Nigerians and Ghanaians are extremely critical of the level of
corruption in their country, and they believe that it promotes the
inequality of wealth and power.14 Ordinary people condemn
corruption at the elite level, but they themselves participate in
networks that socially reproduce corruption.
Similar ambiguity exists in China around the concept of guanxi,
which literally means social relationships or social connections.
Official pronouncements equate guanxi with bribery that
undermines the public interest. However, “embodied in the popular
discourse in the contradiction of the condemnation of guanxi on the
one hand, and admiration and even approbation on the other.”15
Even as they condemn its prevalence, people brag about how they
used guanxi to obtain benefits and refer to the ethics of obligation
and reciprocity.
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One can surely sympathize with a person caught in a personalistic
system based on bribery. Sympathy need not imply acceptance,
however. Corruption is not the inevitable result of history and
culture. Social norms may be deeply embedded and
self-reinforcing, but they do sometimes change; they are not
necessarily frozen in time. And, if a society is ever to build a
legitimate democracy, norms must change. Otherwise, pervasive
corruption will inexorably undermine respect for the rule of law,
generating serious distortions in the efficiency and fairness of
service delivery.
The underlying condemnation of corruption, even by those who
make payoffs in their everyday lives, suggests openings for reform.
Perhaps more public awareness of the costs of payments—whether
labeled gifts or bribes—could change behavior and increase
support for reform. For example, if some people pay to receive
drivers’ licenses even though they do not know how to drive, reform
could begin by publicizing the extra accident risk.16 If a social
welfare program is corrupted by officials who demand payoffs,
reform can give applicants a legal option--for example, through
freedom of information act requests.17 If politicians or political
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parties make direct payments to voters in return for support, voters
need to see that the social cost is a weakening in the
representative character of government.
Ethnographic research tends to concentrate on cultural and social
expectations to explain the prevalence of personalistic ties and quid
pro quo transactions, but these interactions are also tied to the
bargaining power of officials. One must take both factors into
account.
Ethnographers and libertarians who move beyond positive,
empirical analyses of state/society relations often espouse strikingly
similar normative positions. Both stress the way payoffs to public
officials permit non-state institutions to flourish in spite of a set of
formal rules that constrain private behavior. However, each gives a
different set of institutions priority—social ties for one and the
market for the other. Libertarians espouse a universalistic model of
the idealized free market in contrast to the meddling state. They
prefer a minimal state, but absent that condition, some types of
payoffs may helpfully unleash market forces. The ethno-culturalists
reject universalistic models of a good society and often criticize the
corruption literature for its ideal of an impartial, professionally
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competent government. For both groups, corruption is an
understandable response to a dysfunctional reality. Citizens may
engage in rhetorical condemnation, but they cannot function as
economic or social actors without such quid pro quo transfers.18
Libertarians and the ethnographers frequently find common ground
in arguing for the functionality of at least some payoffs, but they
differ sharply on the values that these payoffs may further.
III. grand corruption
Corruption occurs in people’s day-to-day lives and in routine
business activities as people navigate their relationship to the state.
However, of particular important is corruption at the top of the state
hierarchy that involves political leaders and their close associates
and concerns the award of major contracts, concessions and the
privatization of state enterprises. Such “Grand corruption” imposes
large costs on ordinary people by diverting funds to top political
leaders in exchange for sweetheart deals with big foreign and
domestic businesses. As a result, the government may purchase
too much of the wrong kind of military equipment, award natural
resource concessions on unfavorable terms, or privatize
state-owned firms at too low a price. Grand corruption may induce
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leaders to support massive one-of-a-kind infrastructure projects that
have little justification beyond their appeal as bribe generation
machines. Defense contracting, infrastructure spending, and
privatization, of course, are not illegal per se. The problem is the
distortions in both quality and quantity introduced by corruption. In
countries with elections some of kickbacks may be used to court
voters under a variety of vote-buying schemes, but significant funds
also flow to politicians’ personal bank accounts. The costs of such
high level corruption include distorted government spending
priorities, the transfer of funds offshore that could otherwise benefit
citizens, and unfair electoral advantages for incumbents.
Profit-oriented multinational firms sometimes invoke cultural
arguments as a justification for making payoffs to top officials. They
may defend their payoffs in reference to the host country’s
traditions of gift giving and deference to leaders. For example, a
2006 international arbitration dispute involved a $2 million cash
bribe paid to then President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya. No one
disputed the bribe, but the firm claimed that it was respecting the
local East African custom of harambee and that gifts of this type
were “fashionable” in Kenya. The Kenyan government, now under
different leadership, contended that because of the bribe, no valid
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contract existed, implying that it was not guilty of breach. The
arbitration tribunal sided with Kenya.19 A Transparency
International-Kenya (TI-Kenya) study demonstrates that harambee,
originally a type of communal self-help, has been converted into a
form of patronage politics. It is common for politicians who seek
reelection to pay for harambee events that may or may not actually
take place.20 The multi-national firm’s claims to be culturally
sensitive ring hollow, especially in cases, such as this, where the
nation’s citizen bore most of the costs of the bribe and the
unfavorable contract terms that it produced.
On the other side of such deals, top officials may go beyond a
general invocation of local mores to justify their acceptance of
payoffs as a tribute due to them because of their high official rank.
They may use such arguments even if the scale of the gains is
much beyond anything seen in traditional practices.21 These
self-serving arguments conflict with established traditions in many
societies according to Mark Granovetter. In his view, top political
leaders would honor tradition by rejecting bribes as insults,
especially from multi-national firms lacking traditional ties.22 But,
this is not what happens in cases of grand corruption. Instead, the
bribe is often cloaked in traditional practices and facilitated by local
Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State about:reader?url=https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/corruption-greed-culture-and-the-state
15 of 29 4/4/2019 2:50 PM
agents.
A more straightforward culturalist argument sees high level or
“grand” corruption as an import from wealthy, capitalist countries. It
substitutes pure financial incentives for a dense network of
in-country connections. Payoffs induce top leaders to sell out their
political supporters in return for private gain or, in a somewhat more
benign view, to benefit their own supporters at the expense of the
broader public. A polity may already operate in a winner-take-all
fashion with rotating in-groups using the state to benefit themselves
and their supporters. If so, the opportunity to benefit from contracts,
concessions, and asset sales can drastically increase the size of
the pie. A resource discovery or a massive aid package supporting
infrastructure construction may undermine a stable system of
low-level rent seeking by top politicians. It increases the rents
available and tempts leaders to collude with investors to share the
wealth at public expense.
Ethnographers point to the power of the multi-national firms’ profit
motive as well as the traditional perquisites of political power in
developing countries. However, most scholars with deep knowledge
of particular cultures do not confuse explanation with excuse. For
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them, culture enters the argument once again, but now it is the
culture of the business community with its profit-maximizing goal.
The very motivator that the libertarian sees as central to the
development of society is excoriated as the corrupter of the
traditional culture of the contracting country.
Bribes, however, are a cost to firms that pay them. Firms and
officials are in a bargaining game, and it is hard to assign blame
when both must agree to the deal. From the cases that have come
to light it seems that political leaders are not averse to using their
bargaining power to extract private benefits. This observation leads
some to claim that the values of the leaders have been corrupted
by contact with the colonial powers. All would have been well if they
had kept to their societies’ traditional norms and practices. Of
course, sophisticated ethnographers do not have such a romantic
view of “culture” and recognize the interpenetration of Western and
traditional values and practices. Reformers in developing countries
criticize their compatriots who too easily blame an alien culture
introduced by colonial powers for present day realities. As an
Indonesian journalist put it recently: “If corruption is embedded in
the culture, then it is not the fault of the Indonesians themselves
—rather, it can be laid at the feet of those nasty Dutch colonialists .
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. . Not only does this fable get people off the hook for failing to solve
the problem, . . . it also absolves the entire nation of guilt because
the blame lies elsewhere in a long-distant colonial past.”23
The cultural sensitivity card can be played both by those who
accept and by those who pay bribes when it serves their own
interests. One needs to be cautious in accepting at face value
assertions that seemingly corrupt transactions reflect entrenched
cultural practices acceptable to most people. Those with something
to gain will invoke culture as an excuse when it serves their
self-interest. If the scale of the tribute paid to a leader rises to a
new plane as a result of the involvement of international investors,
tradition and culture are not adequate frames for analysis. The
widespread condemnation of bribery and corruption in the studies
of Ghana and Nigeria mentioned earlier seems to confirm that
citizens generally do not accept glib references to “culture” or
“social norms” as sufficient justification.
IV. democratic legitimacy and the control of corruption
The nation-state is a necessary part of any modern society, but one
that must be constrained by its citizens to preserve public
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legitimacy. The state exercises coercive powers, and to claim to be
a democracy, it must publicly justify its exercise of those powers.
Democracy does not require unanimous consent to individual
policies. Doing so would unduly privilege the status quo and invite
gridlock. Rather the policymaking process will almost invariably
produce winners and losers. The key is a process that is broadly
acceptable even if individuals sometimes must bear the costs of a
public policy without any corresponding gains. Decisionmaking by a
majority of elected representatives is one route to democratic
legitimacy, but it is not the only route and cannot realistically be the
only locus of policymaking. Modern problems are too technically
complex, too fluid, and require too much time and trouble to be fully
resolved by statutory texts. Hence, delegation of policymaking is
pervasive in all modern states. Even detailed statutory programs
must be implemented by bureaucrats, perhaps with the help of
private contractors.24
But elected officials, political appointees and bureaucrats may
engage in self-interested behavior that undermines the state’s claim
to legitimacy. Favors done in return for bribes are an archetypal
example of such personalized transactions. The individual quid pro
quo between official and citizen or business firm may be mutually
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beneficial, but collectively these transactions undermine confidence
in the neutral generation and imposition of rules.
In some of the cases outlined earlier, however, impartiality is
absent, and the exercise of public power is bound up with
paternalistic obligations. In those cases, it is difficult to disentangle
corrupt dealings from widely accepted social practices. However,
one option is to demonstrate the costs as well as the benefits of
mixing private concerns with the delivery of public services. If
corruption is an accepted part of government transactions, then
officials are not likely to be passive recipients of gifts from grateful
citizens or of payoffs from business firms. Instead, bureaucrats are
likely to organize their offices and rewrite the rules to induce
additional payoffs, and politicians may structure their activities to
generate ever larger bribes or illegal campaign donations. If this
happens, non-state actors such as organized gangs, on the one
hand, and benevolent associations, on the other, may substitute for
a weak state. The tendency to operate outside the state may create
a feedback loop that further weakens democratic legitimacy and
state power.
The difficulty for democrats is that the economic incentives for
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corruption are the inevitable side effect of a system that governs
through elected representatives and uses bureaucratic agents to
carry out policies. They are pathologies, but they are also the
predictable dark side of the modern state. If corruption is justified as
a reflection of cultural norms, then such acquiescence will further
compromise efforts to produce impartial and competent service
delivery. The communitarian ideal of public deliberation and
consensus combined with a moral obligation to comply with state
policy is not realistic as a general matter once one moves beyond
small villages or tight-knit communities. Tensions between the
democratic welfare state and the private market and between that
state and a country’s traditional cultural practices are all but
inevitable. The response need not always be in favor of the
rationalized, Weberian state. Jennifer Hasty argues that global
strategies that “attempt to tighten the grip of the modern rational
state through abstract, bureaucratic practices of discipline . . . are
bound to fail.” Instead, policy should seek socio-cultural
transformation that builds on existing patterns.25
Anticorruption policy must decide whether to accept the presence
of greed and of cultural practices and to seek to channel them into
less destructive paths, whether to sideline them through substitute
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institutions that require other values and skills, or whether to seek
to transform social norms. These issues must be confronted from
the perspective of democratic legitimacy, not through the lens of
either market fundamentalism or cultural preservation. One needs a
realistic appreciation of the strains facing modern democracies that
seek to justify their legitimacy. Corruption can undermine
governments even if it aids market participants and supports
traditional cultures. However, aggressive and punitive anticorruption
campaigns can also undermine governments’ ability to tap into the
loyalty and good will of their populations.
Corruption in all its myriad forms arises at the intersection between
culture, the market, and the state. Its prevalence forces us to
confront the tangled connections between private wealth and public
power and between cultural practice and the creation of a
competent and impartial government. Sometimes sensitivity to
culture and history in one society will lead to tolerance of actions
that are labeled bribery in other societies. Sometimes public or
private power is so rigid and oppressive that individual payoffs to
avoid the rules seem the only feasible way to cope. Voters do not
always punish flamboyantly corrupt politicians at the polls,
presumably because no credible alternatives exist. It may seem
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better to tolerate an incumbent who takes a share of the spoils of
office than to risk retaliation from the incumbent by supporting an
untested challenger.
What response can those engaged in the study of corruption give to
the critics of anticorruption efforts? As someone who has studied
this topic for thirty-five years,26 I have no easy answers, but I do
have some pointed responses that can help shape the agenda for
future research. None of the critics straightforwardly confronts the
role of the state in society. At the extremes, they have a romantic
view of an idealized society with a minimal state. For libertarians,
the minimal state respects “the rule of law,” a concept that in their
formulation stresses the preservation of private property rights and
the enforcement of private contracts, on the one hand, and the
assurance of law and order, on the other. For ethnographers, social
networks are the key to understanding how individuals interact with
public officials. This literature seldom acknowledges the modern
state’s role in producing and maintaining these networks. Rather,
the state is frequently seen as a hostile or interfering force that
personal networks can domesticate through exchanges of favors.
Those from this tradition who do study the state tend to urge more
participatory, consensual processes of public decision-making often
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organized at the neighborhood and village level.
In contrast to both the libertarians and the ethnographers, I urge a
straightforward acknowledgment of the centrality of the modern
bureaucratic state and the institutions of representative
government.Furthermore, even authoritarian regimes seek popular
legitimacy and support. Given those premises, one can locate
areas of broad international agreement, both at the grass roots
level and among the elite, on certain desirable characteristics of the
modern state that can help curb corruption. So long as political
leaders have some interest in reform, anticorruption policy can start
with these areas of agreement and later confront the more
contested dimensions of the problem.
First, simple transparency is necessary. This option requires
publication of and easy public access to the constitution, legal
codes and statutes, regulations and decrees with the force of law,
legal guidelines and practice manuals, and judicial opinions.
Officials charged with implementation may resist revealing
guidelines and practice manuals, but if they have real effects within
the agency, outsiders should be able to access them. Furthermore,
there should be standardized and transparent public accounting for
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funds appropriated and spent by the government under the control
of both an internal audit office and an independent external audit
body.
Second, external oversight of government activity is essential. One
route is to remove press restrictions and sponsor training in
investigative journalism. It should also be easy to establish and
finance civil society organizations. These dual oversight tracks
complement each other in practice and can only function effectively
if the government itself provides information under the first type of
reforms above. For example, in Bolivia a World Bank study showed
that the quality of public service delivery was negatively associated
with corruption and positively associated with external oversight
and transparency.27 Here authoritarian regimes will part company
with reformers in democracy, but even the Chinese government has
recognized the value of routes for citizen complaints even as it
limits other forms of oversight and protest.
Third, to counter grand corruption, transparent and competitive
processes for large scale procurement should exist. But
governments should not fetishize competitive bidding. They should
take realistic account of the occasional need for sole-source
Corruption: Greed, Culture, and the State about:reader?url=https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/corruption-greed-culture-and-the-state
25 of 29 4/4/2019 2:50 PM
procurement. In that case, the negotiations should be transparent
with the focus on the government obtaining a high quality result at a
good price. Purchases should as much as possible be made by
shopping in private markets in competition with private buyers.
Here international efforts to provide benchmark prices for common
procurement needs could complement domestic efforts.As an
example of how benchmarking might work, one study calculated
the large relative differences in public infrastructure prices by region
in Italy with the implication that regions with high costs per unit
were experiencing high corruption and that better oversight could
improve the productivity of public funds.28
Fourth, the state should enforce bribery laws against major
offenders both in and outside of government. If organized crime is
pervasive, special efforts will be needed to apprehend those
involved in corruption that permits such crime to flourish. I list the
law enforcement option fourth, however, because it ought never be
the primary means of fighting entrenched corruption. If corruption is
the result of institutional failures, it will likely reappear as one group
of malefactors is replaced with another.
Fifth, individuals and businesses should be able to lodge
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complaints about demands for bribes or other favors and to have
these complaints expeditiously dealt with—for example, through an
independent ombudsman. Sixth, reformers should make diagnostic
studies of the rules, regulations, and licensing requirements facing
individuals and businesses to isolate reforms—including
repeal—that might both improve government functioning and
reduce corruption. Seventh, it may be important to improve the pay,
recruitment, and working conditions of civil servants and the
judiciary. Such reform should be combined with strengthened
conflict-of-interest rules and internal monitoring of public service
delivery.
Finally, if corruption is pervasive among politicians, electoral law
may need reform. That would involve enforcement of laws that
outlaw the buying of individual votes and improvements in the
system of campaign finance, the role of lobbyists, and the private
financial interests of politicians to limit conflicts of interest.
Much has been made recently of the efforts to control corruption
through international treaties29 and civil society initiatives, such as
those spearheaded by Transparency International (TI) and the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).30 The G20 in its
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June 2010 communiqué recognized that corruption is a global
problem.31 This international concern is a welcome development
that can complement and reward efforts within host countries,
especially to combat grand corruption by multi-national businesses.
However, existing initiatives have little real bite as hard law. Their
impact depends upon changing mores and on bad publicity, not
legal penalties. These international efforts, laudable as they are,
cannot substitute for domestic reform. Constraining the willingness
of multi-national firms to pay bribes under the OECD Convention
will help undermine firms’ claims to cultural sensitivity, but these
effects can only complement, not substitute for domestic reform.
In discussing corruption, we need to move beyond simplistic claims
either that corruption is functional because government is
dysfunctional or that corruption in a Western concept used to
belittle or to undermine cherished cultural traditions. Both
statements are true in some contexts and false in others.
Domestically, reformers need to concentrate on the policies that
enhance the competent development of public policy, the effective
delivery of services by the bureaucracy, and the fair resolution of
disputes in the courts. They should begin with the functional
responsibilities of the state and then ask how bribery and
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self-dealing interfere with these goals. They should not start with a
presumption against the state born either of excessive faith in the
market or of a deeply conservative respect for tradition.
Representative democracy, bureaucracy, and the courts are facts of
modern life. The study of corruption can help mediate the state and
society boundary but cannot eliminate it. The state is here to stay,
whatever romantics on the libertarian right or on the cultural-studies
left might wish. We had better stop bemoaning that fact and instead
seek realistic reforms that balance state capacity and political will.
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